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Abstract
We hereby develop an effective and efficient testing
methodology for correctness testing for file recovery tools
across different file systems. We assume that the tool tester
is familiar with the formats of common file types and has the
ability to use the tools correctly. Our methodology first de-
rives a testing plan to minimize the number of runs required
to identify the differences in tools with respect to correct-
ness. We also present a case study on correctness testing for
file carving tools, which allows us to confirm that the num-
ber of necessary testing runs is bounded and our results are
statistically sound.
1. Introduction
File recovery tools are commonly used to recover files
from captured digital storage media; they take as input a
chunk of binary data and as output individual files stored in
the chunk. Ideally, a file recovery tool should recover every
target file from the binary chunk, and each recovered file
should be identical to the original one. The requirement of a
tool changes as the forensic scenario varies — for instance,
picture files in a child pornography case, spreadsheet files in
a financial fraud case, compressed archive files in a software
piracy case, and PDF files in a copyright infringement case
— all need a slightly different analysis approach.
Little systematic work on testing file recovery tools has
been done. The CFTT group at NIST published a draft [11]
on testing specifications for deleted file recovery tools with-
out giving any test results. Golden et al. [7, 6] showed that
some recovery tools achieve similar performance indepen-
dently of the file systems used. But correctness testing is
more difficult to conduct than performance testing because
the former needs to validate the output results, while the lat-
ter can be measured by using a stopwatch. So, our motive
in this paper is to develop an effective and efficient testing
methodology for correctness testing for file recovery tools
across different file systems.
To evaluate the correctness of a file recovery tool, we
will measure and compare two independent metrics — the
accuracy and the precision. To measure these two metrics,
we will input an image file containing a number of files to
the tool and count how many files have been successfully
recovered in the output. One tool is better in terms of cor-
rectness than another when the former simultaneously pro-
duces more accurate and more precise results.
In order to avoid introducing bias, we require fairness
and blindness of the testing process; that is, every tool and
every forensic scenario should be considered equally, and
no conclusion should be drawn before the end of the en-
tire testing process. The fairness requirement prevents the
setting up of a biased testing situation — each choice of
tool and scenario is considered equally in every testing run;
the blindness requirement prevents any advantage gained by
deliberately aborting the testing cases.
Due to the fact that most design specifications of digital
forensic tools are not publicly available [3], we assume that
the tool tester knows how to use the tools and uses them
correctly during the testing phase. Furthermore, we assume
that the tester has a clear understanding of the formats of
files encountered in the forensic scenario and can change
the files in the input image.
In previous work, we have introduced a numerical al-
gorithm [13] for deriving a lower bound on the number of
cases needed to be tested to give robust results; and we have
presented two case studies for testing performance of foren-
sic tools — password cracking tools [2] and timestamp ex-
tracting tools [14].
In this paper, we extend the methods of performance test-
ing to the correctness testing context. For testing of perfor-
mance, we chose tools with distinct input/output data char-
acteristics. We present a new case study for testing and
comparing different file recovery tools in terms of the cor-
rectness.
The focus of this paper is to develop an effective and effi-
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cient correctness testing methodology. The effectiveness is
achieved by applying statistically meaningful metrics — the
accuracy rate and the precision rate; the efficiency is guar-
anteed by our previous result in [13] on the general lower
bound of partition testing, which shows that the row size of
matrices used in the testing experiment is directly propor-
tional to the experimental cost.
This paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we
present some relevant results on testing digital forensic
tools. In section 3, we present our testing methodology and
numerically derive a lower bound for the number of testing
cases to achieve the best result. In section 4, we present a
testing example of file carving tools to validate our method-
ology. We conclude in section 5.
2. Related Research
In the context of software engineering, an input domain
is a set of initial conditions to execute a software tool.
Partition testing, in which a tester divides a system’s in-
put domain according to some rule and then tests within
the subdomains, is a common software testing approach
[9, 16, 18, 8]. On the other hand, random testing, in which
a tester randomly tests the system’s input domain, is also
widely used in software testing [1, 5]. If the fairness and
blindness requirements must be fulfilled, partition testing
is proven to be better than random testing as shown in
[16, 18, 8, 13].
The partition testing strategy can be related to the con-
cept of matrices, where a parameter in the input domain can
be represented by a column in a matrix, and a value of a
specific parameter can be represented by an entry in that
matrix. In our case, all possible specific choices of recov-
ery tools or file types can be represented by integer numbers
which can be placed in a matrix. Orthogonal arrays (OAs)
are special kinds of matrices with two properties [15]: 1)
those elements appearing in a column occur the same num-
ber of times; 2) if all possible ordered pairs appear across
two or more arbitrary columns, then the ordered pairs of
elements in these columns occur the same number of times.
The two properties of an orthogonal array ensure that
the fairness condition holds — the first property suggests
an equal chance of appearance of every parameter value;
the second property suggests that all possible values of one
parameter appear against their counterparts of any other pa-
rameter. The blindness requirement is satisfied if all the
rows of an OA are tested as testing suites before drawing
conclusions. Thus, given a set of parameters and corre-
sponding values for a system, an appropriate testing suite
can be found if an orthogonal array exists with the same
number of columns as parameters, and matrix entries corre-
spond to parameter values.
Applying the concept of OAs in performance testing, we
have measured and compared the execution time of forensic
tools [2, 13, 14]. The choice of forensic tool, the configura-
tion setting of the testing computer and the configuration of
the tool may result in different execution times. However,
it is not sufficient to measure correctness by using a single
metric, because there are two independent types of errors —
the true negative (when a tool generates no result for a target
embedded in the input) and the false positive (when a tool
generates a false result for a target actually not embedded
in the input). So we often use both accuracy and precision
as two separate metrics simultaneously to evaluate the cor-
rectness. The accuracy describes how closely the results of
a tool relate to the truth; the precision describes how closely
the results of the tool relate to each other.
The correctness of a file recovery tool is influenced by
the types of files to be recovered, because the recovery
tool needs to check the integrity of candidate result files
by pattern-matching a characteristic header and an optional
footer located at the beginning and the end of every candi-
date file respectively. Such file headers and file footers are
not all standardized or ambiguity-free, and therefore solely
relying on them can result in a false recovery. Hence, we
can alter the presence of certain types of files in an input
image and test the correctness of a file recovery tool. For
the purpose of applying partition testing, the input domain
will be the choice of recovery tool and the presence of dif-
ferent types of files; each of these choices will be considered
as a subdomain.
By using Carrier’s results in [4], a forensic tool can be
compared with another one if their input data and output
data are of the same format and they are used in the same
forensic task. From the viewpoint of the abstraction layer
model [4, 12], forensic tools can be generalized in three
categories in accordance with their input data and output
data formats — 1) inputs a media image file and outputs in-
formation; 2) inputs a media image file and outputs some
standalone files as intermediate results; 3) inputs a stan-
dalone file and outputs information. For instance, a pass-
word cracking tool inputs a standalone file and outputs in-
formation, while a timestamp extracting tool inputs a media
image file and outputs information. We have tested times-
tamp extracting tools in [14] and password cracking tools
in [2, 13], where they belong to the first and the third cate-
gories respectively. File recovery tools belong to the second
category because these tools have as the input format a bi-
nary media image file and as output a number of standalone
files.
3. Our Testing Framework
We propose a new testing framework built on the ideas
presented in Section 2. Our aim is to find the best test-
ing suites to determine correctness of different file recovery
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nF = 1 nF = 2 nF = 3 nF = 4 nF = 5 nF = 6 nF = 7 nF = 8
nT = 2 2 4 8 8 12 12 12 12
nT = 3 6 8 8 8 16 16 16 16
nT = 4 8 8 8 8 16 16 16 16
nT = 5 10 12 16 16 16 16 16 16
nT = 6 12 12 16 16 16 16 16 16
nT = 7 14 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
nT = 8 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Table 1. Lower Bounds For Different Number Of Recovery Tools And File Types
tools, that is, our testing plan should consist of a sufficiently
large number of rows to reveal the difference in correctness
and small enough to economize on the resources needed to
carry out the test. In this section, we determine the num-
ber of rows needed for the testing, and present correctness
metrics and the method of measuring these metrics.
According to our assumptions, different file recovery
tools can be compared to each other if they are working on
the same input image file to recover the same types of files.
In particular, the input binary image can be an image file
of a disk drive, or a data chunk of a network flow captured
by a network sniffer, or a binary dump of the RAM in a
PDA, etc.; the output files are usually known to the forensic
investigators in legal cases — for instance, deleted picture
files on a digital camera used to shoot the crime scene are
of primary interest in a campus bully case.
Given a set of file recovery tools and the forensic scenar-
ios, we are able to construct a parameter list for a correct-
ness test. In the parameter list, the choice of tools usually
has multiple values and the remaining parameters have bi-
nary values indicating whether a file type is included or not,
as discussed in the previous section. We will use OAs in a
partition testing approach for correctness testing for file re-
covery tools, which enables us to manage the testing cost.
The testing cost is directly proportional to the total number
of tests, which is the number of rows of the chosen OA.
Our algorithm presented in [13] offers a general numeri-
cal solution for deriving the smallest row number for choos-
ing appropriate OAs. By following that algorithm, we de-
rive some lower bounds determined by OAs and list them in
Table 1, where nT denotes the number of tools to be tested
and nF denotes the number of file types involved in the test-
ing case. A 16-run OA will be sufficient for up to 8 tools
and 8 file types, as shown in Table 1; an 8-run OA will be
sufficient for 4 tools and 4 file types, which will be used in
the case study.
Having determined the testing cost, our objective be-
comes to find good metrics to indicate the correctness of
different file recovery tools. For file recovery tools, it is
easy to examine the recovery results and compare the re-
lated statistics, such as how many files are correctly recov-
ered out of the total and how many files have been produced
during the recovery. Therefore, we select the accuracy rate
and the precision rate as metrics because they are easy to
calculate and statistically meaningful. In this paper, we de-
fine the accuracy rate as the number of correctly recovered
files out of the total number of original files to be recovered,
and the precision rate as the total number of recovered files
out of the total number of original files. The ideal values
for both metrics are 1. Note that the accuracy rate is al-
ways less than 1 and the precision rate may exceed 1, so
that a tool with high false positive rate will stand out easily.
This gives an advantage in the usual forensic settings when
a small percentage of files is needed to be recovered from
the input image file.
To determine whether a file is correctly recovered, we
propose to compare the hash values obtained by using mul-
tiple hashing programs — for example, MD5 and SHA-1.
This is to reduce the collision rate from that obtained by
applying a single hash algorithm.
The workload file as the input image should include all
relevant file types in order to satisfy our fairness require-
ment. And the distribution of files should be as random as
possible. To increase the confidence of testing results, at
least two independently generated workload files should be
used in each testing case.
To determine the detailed testing scheme, we use the
same strategy as described in the Taguchi method [17] to
relate the list to an OA — each parameter is represented by
a distinct column of the selected OA; each value of a param-
eter is randomly linked to a symbol in the corresponding
column which represents that parameter. Then, each test-
ing suite is represented by a row of the OA. Therefore, the
number of rows of the OA becomes the number of testing
runs for the given parameter list. After the testing phase
is completed, we again use the Taguchi method to process
the resulting data into the accuracy rate and the precision
rate, and thereafter conduct the proper statistical analysis.
The Taguchi method is not the focus of this paper and so a
description of it is omitted.
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Runs Tools Picture Office Archive Document A1 A2 P1 P2
1 0 0 0 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 700.00%
2 0 1 1 1 1 26.67% 0.00% 180.00% 65.63%
3 1 0 0 1 1 14.29% 0.00% 100.00% 33.33%
4 1 1 1 0 0 33.33% 30.43% 108.33% 82.61%
5 2 0 1 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 122.22% 80.00%
6 2 1 0 1 0 20.00% 25.00% 2280.00% 765.00%
7 3 0 1 1 0 0.00% 0.00% 187.50% 200.00%
8 3 1 0 0 1 45.45% 21.74% 154.55% 113.04%
Table 2. Testing Rounds And Results Of The Case Study
In the next section, we will perform correctness testing
for some popular file recovery tools.
4. Case Study — Correctness Testing On File
Carving Tools
To validate our methodology, we conducted a correct-
ness test on file carving tools. File carving tools are a spe-
cial type of file recovery tools, which can recover files with-
out requiring the file system information. We chose tools
which are able to recover multiple file types from any arbi-
trary binary image file. Four well-known and easily acces-
sible tools were therefore selected — FTK1, X-Ways Foren-
sics2, Foremost3 and Scalpel4. These tools can be used to
recover files from a raw binary image, according to their
specifications. We were interested in recovering files of 4
categories — picture files (JPG, GIF and BMP), Microsoft
office files (DOC, XLS and PPT), compressed archive files
(ZIP) and document files (PDF and HTML).
We chose an 8-row orthogonal array for testing these 4
tools and 4 file types, as mentioned in Section 3. The testing
runs were arranged as following — in testing runs 1 and
2, we used FTK; in testing runs 3 and 4, we used X-Ways
Forensics; in testing runs 5 and 6, we used Foremost; in
testing runs 7 and 8, we used Scalpel.
We used two different workload files — testing image
number 11 from the DFTT site and the file carving chal-
lenge file used in DFRWS’06. The plot of average accuracy
and precision of each testing run is shown in Figure 1. The
precision rates in the 1st and the 6th testing runs signifi-
cantly deviated from the ones in the remaining runs; but
the accuracy rates did not differ significantly across testing
1Forensic ToolKit, version 1.61, available from http://www.
accessdata.com/.
2X-Ways Forensics, version 12.74, available from http://www.
x-ways.net/forensics/index-m.html.
3Foremost, version 1.5, available from http://foremost.
sourceforge.net/.
4Scalpel, version 1.6, available from http://www.
digitalforensicssolutions.com/Scalpel/.
runs, as shown in Figure 1. As mentioned in Section 3, the
ideal values for the accuracy rate and the precision rate are
1, i.e. 100% in the figure. The precision rates may exceed
100%, and the more deviation the worse the data. X-ways
Forensics in runs 3 and 4 produced the best accuracy rate
and precision rate; on the other hand, picture files were most
likely to be recovered correctly by using any tool among the
4 different file types.
Figure 1. Average Accuracy And Precision
Rate Observed In The 8 Testing Runs
The testing results are listed in Table 2, where A1 and P1
respectively denote the accuracy rate and the precision rate
when the workload was the DFTT testing image # 11; A2
and P2 respectively denote the accuracy rate and the preci-
sion rate when the workload was the DFRWS’06 file carv-
ing challenge file. The best accuracy rate was around 0.45
scored by Scalpel in testing run 8; and the best precision
rate was 1.0 scored by X-Ways Forensics in testing run 3.
These results suggested that Scalpel and X-Ways Forensics
were good choices.
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The ANOVA [10] results indicated that the picture files
and the archive files influenced the accuracy rate signifi-
cantly, showing that a testing plan with 2× 2 = 4 runs will
be sufficient to observe difference in accuracy regarding this
tool set; the ANOVA results also indicated that the choice of
recovery tools, the document files, the archive files, and the
office files influenced the precision rate significantly, show-
ing that a testing plan with 4× 2× 2× 2 = 32 runs will be
sufficient to observe differences in precision regarding the
tool set.
These results indicated that our methodology is effective
and efficient for correctness testing for file recovery tools,
because it requires no previous knowledge of tools and the
test is carried out within a small number of runs. Regarding
the given set of 4 tools, a tester has to try 4, 8, 12, 16, 20
. . . and so on runs to test every tool equally often, which
is regulated by our fairness requirement. In the accuracy
test, 4 runs are sufficient to reveal tool differences so our
methodology overestimates by 4 runs. In the precision test,
a 32-run test reveals exact differences in precision among
the 4 tools, but our 8-run test revealed differences at a suffi-
ciently useful degree. In this case, we saved 24 runs which
is significant.
5. Conclusion
In this study, we develop an effective and efficient testing
methodology for correctness testing for file recovery tools.
Our assumptions are that the tester uses tools correctly dur-
ing the testing phase and knows the data formats of in-
putting and outputting data. No design knowledge about
tools is required.
This work is the first extension of our previous work
which targeted performance testing for digital forensic
tools. We are able to make this extension for file recovery
tools because we have successfully established an effective
yet simple metric — the accuracy rate and the precision rate.
In addition, it is not difficult to determine whether recovery
is successful by simply checking any change in the hash
value of the recovered files.
We believe that this framework for correctness testing
can be applied for testing keyword searching tools, network
filters and other tools which input multiple types of files
and output some of them based on the results of the content
analysis.
However, an effective metric to measure the correctness
of general digital forensic tools is still hard to find, but is
critical for conducting comparative testing.
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